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Abstract
Ransomware constitutes a significant threat to the Android operating system. It can either lock or encrypt the target
devices, and victims are forced to pay ransoms to restore their data. Hence, the prompt detection of such attacks
has a priority in comparison to other malicious threats. Previous works on Android malware detection mainly focused
on Machine Learning-oriented approaches that were tailored to identifying malware families, without a clear focus
on ransomware. More specifically, such approaches resorted to complex information types such as permissions, user-
implemented API calls, and native calls. However, this led to significant drawbacks concerning complexity, resilience
against obfuscation, and explainability. In this paper, we propose a different, static approach to accurately detect
Android ransomware, which is independent of user-defined information and that leverages the fact that ransomware
attacks heavily resort to System API to perform their actions. More specifically, by only using System API-based
information, it is possible to detect ransomware accurately and to distinguish it from generic malware and goodware.
To this end, we proposed and tested three different ways of employing System API by using packages, classes, and
methods, and we compared their performances to other, more complex state-of-the-art approaches. The attained results
showed that systems based on System API could detect ransomware and generic malware with very good accuracy,
comparable to systems that employed more complex information. Moreover, the proposed systems could accurately
detect novel samples in the wild and showed resilience against static obfuscation attempts. Finally, to guarantee early
on-device detection, we developed and released on the Android platform a complete ransomware and malware detector
that employed one of the methodologies proposed in this paper.
Keywords: Malware, Android, Ransomware, Machine Learning, Security
1. Introduction
The term ransomware refers to attacks that lock the vic-
tim’s device or encrypt its data, by asking a sum of money
to restore the compromised functionality. Despite the in-
creasing diffusion of cloud-based technologies, users still
store the majority of their data directly on their devices.
For this reason, such attacks are particularly devastating,
as they could destroy sensitive data of private users and
companies (which often neglect to make backups of sen-
sitive data). According to Symantec, the number of ran-
somware variants increased in 2017 by 46%, with massive
outbreaks such as the one concerning Ukrainian companies
(Petya/NotPetya). Hence, it is not surprising to see that
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the same trend applied to mobile ransomware, with more
than 42, 000 samples blocked in 2017 [25].
Mobile ransomware typically features different charac-
teristics in comparison to its X86 counterpart. As perform-
ing data encryption typically requires high-level privileges
(especially to write on areas that are directly managed
by the kernel), most attacks only lock the target device
by making victims believe that their data are encrypted,
or by warning them that the police currently control them
for their actions (a strategy directly inspired by scareware-
based approaches).
To counteract such attacks, Machine Learning has been
increasingly used (especially combined with static anal-
ysis) both by researchers and anti-malware companies,
either to perform direct detection or to generate signa-
tures. While the goal of static detection systems is of-
ten to discriminate between generic malware and legiti-
mate files (as in [13, 5, 10, 1]), some recently-released ones
focus on further identifying malware families, in particu-
lar ransomware-related ones (also known as ransomware-
oriented detection) [3, 29, 14]. The reason for such a choice
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is that ransomware infections may lead to permanent data
loss, making their early detection critical.
The main characteristic of systems to detect malware
families is that they rely on different types of information
extracted from multiple parts of the apps (e.g., bytecode,
manifest, native libraries, and so forth [5, 3, 29, 10, 14]),
which leads to use large amounts of features (even hun-
dreds of thousands). While this approach is tempting and
may seem to be effective against the majority of attacks in
the wild, it features various limitations. First, it is unclear
which features are essential (and needed) for classification,
an aspect that worsens the overall explainability of the sys-
tem (i.e., why the system makes mistakes and how to fix
them). Second, increasing the types of features extends
the degrees of freedom of a skilled attacker to perform tar-
geted attacks against the learning algorithm. For example,
it would be quite easy to mask a specific IP address, if the
attacker understood that this has a vital role for detec-
tion [13]. Finally, the computational complexity of such
systems is enormous, which makes them unfeasible to be
practically used in mobile devices, an important aspect to
guarantee offline, early detection of these attacks.
In a previous work [20], we proposed a system that al-
lowed to discriminate between ransomware, generic mal-
ware, and legitimate files by focusing on a small-sized
feature set, i.e., System API packages. The idea of our
work was to overcome the limitations described above by
showing that it was possible to solve a machine learning
problem with a limited number of features of the same
type. However, System API-based information does not
only include packages but also classes and methods (par-
ticularly employed in other works, especially mixed with
other feature types [5, 14]) that better define the behavior
of APIs. Intuitively, using finer-grained information leads
to better accuracy and robustness in comparison to other
approaches. In this paper, we explore such a possibility
by extending our work in [20]. In particular, we inspected
the capabilities of multiple types of System API-related in-
formation to discriminate ransomware from malware and
goodware. More specifically, we aimed to provide an an-
swer to the following Research Questions:
• RQ 1. Does the use of finer-grained information re-
lated to System API (i.e., classes and methods) im-
prove detection performances in comparison to more
general System API packages?
• RQ 2. Is System API-based information suitable to
detect novel attacks in the wild?
• RQ 3. Does using System API-based information
provide comparable performances to other approaches
that employ multiple feature types?
• RQ 4. Is System API-based information resilient
against obfuscation attempts?
To answer such Research Questions, we explored three
types of System API-based information: the first one only
used information related to System API packages (as al-
ready shown in [20]), the second one analyzed System API
classes, and the third one employed information related to
System API methods. We evaluated the performances of
the three systems on a wide range of ransomware, malware
and goodware samples in the wild (including previously
unseen data). Moreover, we tested all systems against a
dataset of ransomware samples that have been obfuscated
with multiple techniques (including class encryption).
The attained results showed that all System API-based
techniques provided excellent accuracy at detecting ran-
somware and generic malware in the wild, by also show-
ing capabilities of predicting novel attacks and resilience
against obfuscation. From a methodological perspective,
such results demonstrate that it is possible to develop ac-
curate systems by strongly reducing the complexity of the
examined information and by selecting feature types that
represent how ransomware attacks behave.
Finally, we ported the System API package-based strat-
egy to the Android phone with the name of R-PackDroid
(see also [20]). Our application, which can detect both
ransomware and generic malware in the wild, shows that
methodologies based on System API can be implemented
with good computational performances even in old phones,
and its a demonstration of a full working prototype being
deployed on real analysis environments. R-Packdroid can
be downloaded for free from the Google Play Store1.
With this work, we claim that it is possible to create ef-
fective, deployable, and reasonably secure approaches for
ransomware and malware detection by only using specific
feature types. Hence, we believe that the attention of re-
search should be shifted to finding effective and explain-
able feature types to make detection even more accurate
and robust.
Paper structure. Section 2 provides the basic con-
cepts of Android apps; Section 3 discusses the essential
characteristics of Android ransomware and describes the
key-intuitions behind using System API calls as critical in-
formation; Section 4 provides a description of the related
work in the field; Section 5 describes the employed detec-
tion methodologies; Section 6 illustrates the experimental
results attained with all the methodologies, as well as a
comparison between our systems and other approaches in
the wild; Section 7 describes the implementation details
of R-PackDroid and its computational performances; Sec-
tion 8 discusses the limitations of our work, which is finally
concluded by Section 9.
2. Background on Android
Android applications are zipped .apk (i.e., Android ap-
plication package) archives that contain the following ele-
ments: (i) The AndroidManifest.xml file, which provides
1http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/RPackDroid
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the application package name, and lists its basic compo-
nents, along with the permissions that are required for
specific operations; (ii) One or more classes.dex files,
which are the true executable of the application, and which
contain all the implemented classes and methods (in the
form of Dalvik bytecode) that are executed by the app.
This file can be disassembled to a simplified format called
smali; (iii) Various .xml files that characterize the appli-
cation layout; (iv) External resources that include, among
others, images and native libraries.
Although Android applications are typically written
in Java, they are compiled to an intermediate byte-
code format called Dalvik (which is further referred to
as DexCode), whose instructions are contained in the
classes.dex file. This file is then further parsed at in-
stall time and converted to native ARM code that is ex-
ecuted by the Android RunTime (ART). This technique
allows to greatly speed up execution in comparison to the
previous runtime (dalvikvm, available till Android 4.4), in
which applications were executed with a just-in-time ap-
proach (during installation, the classes.dex file was only
slightly optimized, but not converted to native code).
3. Android Ransomware
The key point presented in this work is that the static
extraction of System API-based information can be effec-
tive at detecting ransomware. More specifically, System
APIs encapsulate many of the key actions performed by
such attacks. To better reinforce this concept, in the fol-
lowing, we describe the basic actions performed by An-
droid ransomware. The majority of ransomware-based at-
tacks for Android are based on the goal of locking the
device screen while asking the victim for money in order
to unlock it. According to the taxonomy proposed by [9],
there are multiple ways to do so: (i) by resorting to a hi-
jacking activity (i.e., a screen that the user visualizes and
with which she can interact) that is continuously shown;
(ii) by setting up specific parameters of specific API calls;
(iii) by disabling certain buttons, such home or back.
Locking is generally preferred to other data encryption
strategies because it does not require to operate on high-
privileged data. Indeed, accessing specific areas of the An-
droid internal memory would only be possible with root
permissions. Conversely, locking the device does not re-
quire particularly high privileges, and would allow the at-
tacker to ensure his goal (i.e., scaring the victim) with
minimum effort. The majority of locking screens show
the victim writings and images related to police activities
or pornographic material. There are, however, samples
that also perform data encryption. According to [9], only
four ransomware families possess the ability of encrypting
data: Simplocker, Koler, Cokri and Fobus. In particu-
lar, some of these families employ a customized encryption
algorithm, while others resort to standard algorithms.
As locking and encryption actions require the use of
multiple functions that involve core functionalities of the
1
2 invoke-virtual {v9},
Landroid/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager;-> lockNow()V
3 move-object v9, v0
4 move-object v10 , v1
5
6 ...
7
8 move-result-object v9
9 move-object v10 , v7
10 const/4 v11 , 0x0
11 invoke-virtual {v9, v10 , v11},
Landroid/app/admin/DevicePolicyManager;->
resetPassword (Ljava/lang/String;I)Z
Listing 1: Part of the onPasswordChanged() method belonging
to a locker-type ransomware sample.
system (e.g., managing entire arrays of bytes, displaying
activities, manipulating buttons and so on), attackers tend
to use functions that directly belong to the Android System
API. It would be extremely time consuming and inefficient
to build new APIs that perform the same actions as the
original ones.
As an example of this behavior, consider the DexCode
snippet provided by Listing 1, belonging to a locker-
type ransomware2. In this example, it is possible
to observe that the two function calls (expressed by
invoke-virtual instructions) that are actually used
to lock the screen (lockNow) and reset the password
(resetPassword) are System API calls, belonging to
the class DevicePolicyManager and to the package
android/app/admin. The same behavior is provided
by Listing 2, which shows the encryption function em-
ployed by a crypto-type ransomware sample3. Again,
the functions to manipulate the bytes to encrypt belong
to the System API (read and close, belonging to the
FileInputStream class of the java/io package; flush
and close, belonging to the CipherOutputStream class
of the javax/crypto package).
In an Android application, based on Java, multiple
methods are associated with classes that belong to pack-
ages. Because of these characteristics, it is possible to en-
code and represent System API information by either us-
ing packages, classes, or methods. More specifically, meth-
ods and classes better detail the functionality performed
by the single API, but their number is significantly higher
in comparison to packages. Hence, a solution that would
employ the analysis of API methods would be far more
complex than one that analyzes packages.
4. Related work
Most of Android malware detectors typically discrimi-
nate between malicious and benign apps, and we refer to
them as generic malware-oriented detectors. However, as
the scope of this work is mostly oriented to ransomware
2MD5: 0cdb7171bcd94ab5ef8b4d461afc446c
3MD5: 59909615d2977e0be29b3ab8707c903a
3
1
2 Ljava/io/FileInputStream;-> read([B)I
3 move-result v0
4 const/4 v5 , -0x1
5 if-ne v0 , v5, :cond_0
6 invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljavax/crypto/CipherOutputStream;->
flush()V
7 invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljavax/crypto/CipherOutputStream;->
close()V
8 invoke-virtual {v3}, Ljava/io/FileInputStream;-> close()V
Listing 2: Parts of the encrypt() method belonging to an
encryption-type ransomware sample.
detection, this Section will be mainly focused on describ-
ing systems that aim to detect such attacks (ransomware-
oriented detectors) specifically. A brief description of the
other detectors will be provided at the end of this Section.
The most popular and publicly available ransomware-
oriented detector is HelDroid, proposed by Andronio et
al. [3]. This tool includes a text classifier (based on NLP
features) that works on suspicious strings used by the ap-
plication, a lightweight smali emulation technique to de-
tect locking strategies, and the application of taint track-
ing for detecting file-encrypting flows. The system has
then been further expanded by Zheng et al. with the new
name of GreatEatlon and features significant speed im-
provements, a multiple-classifier system that combines the
information extracted by text- and taint-analysis, and so
forth [29]. However, despite using features oriented to ran-
somware detection, the final label provided for each ana-
lyzed sample by the released system is only malicious or
benign, with no clear decision on the sample being ran-
somware or not. Furthermore, the system is still compu-
tationally demanding and it still strongly depends on a
text classifier: the authors trained it on generic threat-
ening phrases, similar to those that typically appear in
ransomware or scareware. This strategy can be easily
thwarted by employing, e.g., string encryption [19]. More-
over, it strongly depends on the presence of a language
dictionary for that specific ransomware campaign.
Yang et al. proposed a tool to monitor the activity
of ransomware by dumping the system messages log, in-
cluding stack traces. Sadly, no implementation has been
released for public usage [27].
Song et al. proposed a method that aims to discriminate
between ransomware and goodware using process moni-
toring [24]. In particular, they considered system-related
features representing the I/O rate, as well as the CPU and
memory usage. The system has been evaluated with only
one ransomware sample developed by the authors, and no
implementation is publicly available.
Cimitille et al. introduced an approach to detect ran-
somware that is based on formal methods (by using a tool
called Talos), which help the analyst identify malicious
sections in the app code [22, 11]. In particular, starting
from the definition of payload behavior, the authors manu-
ally formulated logic rules that were later applied to detect
ransomware. Unfortunately, such a procedure can become
extremely time-consuming, as an expert should manually
express such rules.
Gharib et al. proposed Dna-Droid, a static and dy-
namic approach in which applications are first statically
analyzed, and then dynamically inspected if the first part
of the analysis returned a suspicious result. The system
uses Deep Learning to provide a classification label [15].
The static part is based on textual and image classifica-
tion, as well as on API calls and application permissions.
The dynamic part relies on sequences of API calls that
are compared to malicious sequences, which are related to
malware families. This approach has the drawback that
heavily obfuscated apps can escape the static filter, thus
avoiding to be dynamically analyzed. Finally, Chen et al.
proposed RansomProber, a purely dynamic ransomware
detector which employs a set of rules to monitor differ-
ent aspects of the app execution, such as the presence of
encryption or anomalous layout structures. The attained
results report a very high accuracy, but the system has not
been publicly released yet (to the best of our knowledge).
Table 1 shows a comparison between the state-of-the-
art methods for specifically detecting or analyzing Android
ransomware. It is possible to observe that there is a cer-
tain balance between static- and dynamic-based methods.
Some of them also resort to Machine-Learning to perform
classification. Notably, only HelDroid and GreatEatlon
are currently publicly available.
Concerning generic malware-oriented detectors, Arp et
al. proposed Drebin, a machine learning system that uses
static analysis to discriminate between generic malware
and trusted files. They extracted various features from
both the Manifest file and the Android executable, includ-
ing IP addresses, suspicious API calls, permissions, and
so forth. [5]. Tam et al. introduced a system to perform
dynamic analysis and detection of Android malware by an-
alyzing the system calls performed by the application [26].
Avdieenko et al. used taint analysis to detect anomalous
flows of sensitive data, a technique that allowed to detect
novel malware samples without previous knowledge [6].
Yang et al. analyzed malicious apps by defining and ex-
tracting the context related to security-sensitive events. In
particular, the authors defined a model of context based
on two elements: activation conditions (i.e., what makes
specific events occur) and guarding conditions (i.e., the
environmental attributes of a specific event) [28].
Aresu et al. clustered Android malware by using the
network HTTP traffic generated by those applications [4].
Such clusters can be used to generate signatures that al-
low discriminating between malware and legitimate ap-
plications. Canfora et al. experimentally evaluated two
techniques for detecting Android malware: the first one is
based on Hidden Markov Model (HMM), and the second
one exploits Structural Entropy [8]. The attained results
showed that both techniques could be suitable for Android
malware detection.
Chen et al. proposed StormDroid, a static and dynamic
machine-learning based system that extracts information
4
Table 1: An overview of the current state-of-the-art, ransomware-oriented approaches.
Work Year Static Dynamic Machine-Learning Available
Chen et al. (RansomProber) [9] 2018 X
Cimitille et al. (Talos) [11] 2017 X
Gharib et al. (Dna-Droid) [15] 2017 X X X
Song et al. [24] 2016 X
Zheng et al. (GreatEatlon) [29] 2016 X X X
Yang et al. [27] 2015 X
Andronio et al. (HelDroid) [3] 2015 X X X
from API-calls, permissions and behavioral features [10].
Finally, Ahmadi et al. proposed IntelliAV, a generic
malware-oriented detector that is publicly available. Such
a detector provides a level of dangerousness for each app
but does not directly specify the family nor the type of
attack [1].
Garcia et al. proposed RevealDroid, a static system for
detecting Android malware samples and classifying them
in families. The system employs features extracted from
reflective calls, native APIs, permissions, and many other
characteristics of the file. The attained results showed that
RevealDroid was able to attain very high accuracy, re-
silience to obfuscation. However, the number of extracted
features can be extremely high and depends on the train-
ing data [14].
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we mention here
other recent works that have analyzed the topic of ran-
somware detection on X86 (in particular, on Windows
platforms) by employing dynamic analysis techniques to
perform early detection of the attack. Using such tech-
niques avoid possible damages to the operating system and
its files. [12, 17, 18, 16].
5. Methodologies
We now describe the general structure of systems that
employ System API information to identify ransomware,
also known as ransomware-oriented detectors. While the
majority of learning-based detection systems combine var-
ious types of information to detect as many attacks as pos-
sible, ransomware-oriented detectors tailor their detection
on a smaller set of information (System API) that is typi-
cally employed in ransomware. However, as System APIs
are also widely used in generic malware and legitimate files,
this information type also allows detecting other attacks
that differ to ransomware. In this way, it is possible to
create a powerful, wide-spectrum detector that features a
much lower complexity in comparison to other approaches.
Typically, such systems take as input an Android applica-
tion, analyze it and return three possible outputs: ran-
somware, generic malware or trusted. The analysis is
performed in three steps:
• Pre-Processing. In this phase, the application is
analyzed to extract its DexCode. The required infor-
mation is extracted by only inspecting the executable
code and does not perform any analysis on other ele-
ments, such as the application Manifest. Only specific
lines of code, which will be described later in this Sec-
tion, will be sent to the next module.
• Feature Extraction (System API). In this phase,
the code lines received from the previous phase are
further analyzed to extract the related System API
information (either packages, classes, or methods).
The occurrence of such pieces of information is then
counted, thus producing a vector of numbers (feature
vector) that is sent to a classifier.
• Classifier. Classification is carried out through a su-
pervised approach, in which the system is trained with
samples whose label (i.e., benign, generic malware or
ransomware) is known. Such technique has been used
in previous works with excellent results [5, 13, 14].
In particular, our approaches employ Random Forest
classifiers, which are especially useful to handle multi-
class problems, and which are widely used for malware
detection. The complexity of such classifiers depends
on the number of trees that compose them. Such a
number must be optimized during the training phase.
The structure above is graphically represented in Figure
1. In the following, we provide more details about each
phase of the analysis, by focusing in particular on the type
of features that can be extracted from the application.
5.1. Preprocessing and Feature Extraction
The general idea of the first two phases is performing
static analysis of the Dalvik bytecode contained in the
classes.dex file. The goal is retrieving the System API
information employed by the executable code of the ap-
plication. The choice of System API information is related
to two basic ideas:
• Coherence with actions. Most ransomware writers
resort to System APIs to carry out memory- or kernel-
related actions (for example, file encryption or mem-
ory management). Focusing on user-implemented
APIs (as it happens, for example, with Drebin [5])
exposes the system to a risk of being evaded by sim-
ply employing different packages to perform actions.
5
Pre-Processing
Dex
Extraction
Feature Extraction
Package/Class/
Method (DexLib)
Classifier
Trusted
Malware
Ransomware
classes.dex [x1,x2…xn]
Random Forest 
(Tensorflow)
Figure 1: General Structure of a System API-based, ransomware-oriented system.
• Independence from Training. System API calls
are features independent of the training data that are
used. As a consequence, it is less likely that appli-
cations are not correctly analyzed only because they
employ never-seen-before APIs.
• Resilience against obfuscation. Using heavy ob-
fuscation routines typically lead to injecting system
API-based code in the executable, which can be ex-
tracted and analyzed, allowing to detect suspicious
files.
Pre-processing is hence easily performed by directly ex-
tracting the classes.dex file from the .apk app. Since
.apk files are essentially zipped archives, such an opera-
tion is rather straight-forward.
Once pre-processing is complete, the classes.dex file is
further analyzed by the feature extraction module, which
inspects the executable file for all invoke-type instructions
(i.e., all instructions related to invocations) contained in
the classes.dex code. Then, each invocation is inspected
to extract the relevant API information for each method-
ology, according to a System API reference list that de-
pends on the operating system version (in our case, An-
droid Nougat - API level 25 - a widely-used API set). Only
the API elements that belong to the reference list are an-
alyzed. In this paper, we consider three different method-
ologies, based on, respectively, package, class, and method
extraction. If a specific API element is found, its occur-
rence value is increased by one.
In the following, we provide a more detailed description
of the methodologies employed in this paper, by referring
to the example reported in Listing 3. The code is parsed
in three ways, according to each feature extraction strat-
egy. For each example, we used a very small subset of the
employed reference API.
• Packages Extraction. In this methodology, we
extract the occurrences of the System API pack-
ages (a total of 270 reference features), in the same
way of our previous work [20]. In the example of
Listing 3, we used a subset composed of three ref-
erence API packages: java/io, java/crypto and
java/lang. The four invoke instructions are related
to the javax/crypto and java/io packages, which
are counted respectively twice. The java/lang pack-
age is never used in this snippet. Hence, its value is
zero.
• Classes Extraction. In this methodology, we ex-
tract the occurrences of the System API classes (a to-
tal of 4609 reference features). Notably, such classes
belong to the System API packages of the previous
methodology (and, for this reason, their number is
significantly higher than packages). In the example
of Listing 3, we used a subset composed of two ref-
erence API classes: java/io/FileInputStream and
javax/crypto/CypherOutputStream, each of them
appearing twice.
• Methods Extraction. In this methodology, we
extract the occurrences of the System API methods
(a total of 36148 reference features). These methods
belong to the System API classes of the previous
methodology, leading to a very consistent number of
features. This strategy is very similar to other ones
employed by other systems (e.g.. [5, 14]), which have
used these features together with user-implemented
APIs and other features. In the example of Listing
3, we used a subset composed of four reference
API methods: java/io/FileInputStream/read,
javax/crypto/CypherOutputStream/flush,
javax/crypto/CypherOutputStream/close and
java/io/FileInputStream/close. Each API call
appears only once. Note that, although there are two
methods named close, they belong to two different
classes, and they are therefore considered as different
methods.
6. Experimental Evaluation
In this Section, we report the experimental results at-
tained from the evaluation of the three API-based strate-
gies. Note that, for the sake of simplicity and speed, we
did not run the experiments on Android phones, but on
6
1
2 Code
3
4 Ljava/io/FileInputStream;-> read([B)I
5 move-result v0
6 const/4 v5 , -0x1
7 if-ne v0 , v5, :cond_0
8 invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljavax/crypto/CipherOutputStream;->
flush()V
9 invoke-virtual {v1}, Ljavax/crypto/CipherOutputStream;->
close()V
10 invoke-virtual {v3}, Ljava/io/FileInputStream;-> close()V
11
12 Feat. Vectors
13
14 Packages - [2 2 0]
15
16 Classes - [2 2]
17
18 Methods - [1 1 1 1]
Listing 3: An example of feature extraction by considering a
small number of reference features.
an X86 machine. However, we built a full, working im-
plementation of one of the three approaches, which can be
downloaded from the Google Play Store (see next Section).
The rest of this Section is organized as follows: we start
by providing an overview of the dataset employed in our
experiments. Then, we describe the results attained by
four evaluations. The first one aimed to establish the gen-
eral performances of API-based approaches by considering
random distributions of training and test samples. The
second one aimed to show how API-based approaches be-
haved when analyzing samples released after the training
data. The third one aimed to show a comparison between
our API-based approaches and other systems that em-
ployed mixed features. Finally, we evaluated the resilience
of API-based approaches against obfuscation techniques
and evasion attacks.
6.1. Dataset
In the following, we describe the dataset employed in
our experiments. Without considering obfuscated appli-
cations (which are going to be discussed in Section 6.3),
we obtained and analyzed 39 157 apps, which are organized
in the three categories we mentioned in Section 5.
6.1.1. Ransomware
The 3017 samples used for our ransomware dataset were
retrieved from the VirusTotal service4 (which aggregates
the detection of multiple anti-malware solutions) and from
the HelDroid dataset5 [3]. With respect to the samples ob-
tained from VirusTotal, we used the following procedure
to obtain the samples: (i) we searched and downloaded
the Android samples whose anti-malware label included
the word ransom; (ii) for each downloaded sample, we ex-
tracted its family by using the AVClass tool [23], which
4http://www.virustotal.com
5https://github.com/necst/heldroid
essentially combines the various labels provided by anti-
malware solutions to create a unique label that identifies
the sample itself; (iii) we considered only those samples
whose family was coherent to ransomware behaviors, or
was known to belong to ransomware.
Table 2: Ransomware families included in the employed
dataset.
Family Samples
Locker 752
Koler 601
Svpeng 364
SLocker 281
Simplocker 201
LockScreen 122
Fusob 120
Lockerpin 120
Congur 90
Jisut 86
Other 280
In general, our goal was obtaining a representative cor-
pus of ransomware to ascertain the prediction capabilities
of API-based techniques. For this reason, the dataset in-
cludes families that perform both device locking (such as
Svpeng and LockScreen) and encryption (such as Koler
and SLocker). For a better description of the families
above, please see Section 3.
6.1.2. Malware and Trusted
We considered a dataset composed of 17 744 Android
malware samples that do not belong to the ransomware
category, taken from the following sources: (i) Drebin
dataset, one of the most recent, publicly available datasets
of malicious Android applications6 (which also contains
the samples from the Genome dataset [30]); (ii) Contagio,
a popular free source of malware for X86 and mobile;
(iii) VirusTotal. These samples were chosen to verify
whether even non-ransomware attacks could be detected
with features that are particularly effective at classifying
ransomware samples.
In order to download trusted applications, we resorted
to two data sources: (i) we crawled the Google Play mar-
ket using an open-source crawler7 (ii) we extracted a num-
ber of applications from the AndroZoo dataset [2], which
features a snapshot of the Google Play store, allowing to
access applications without crawling the Google services
easily. We obtained 18 396 applications that belong to all
the different categories available on the market. We chose
to focus on the most popular apps to increase the proba-
bility of downloading malware-free apps.
6https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/~danarp/drebin/
7https://github.com/liato/android-market-API-py
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Figure 2: Results for the experiment 1. In the first row, we report the ROC curves (averaged on 5 splits) attained by the three
System API methods for ransomware (a) and generic malware (b) against benign samples. In the second row, we report the top-25
features, ordered by the classifier information gain (calculated by averaging, for each feature, the gains that were obtained by
training the 5 splits), for each methodology ((c) for packages, (d) for classes, (e) for methods).
6.2. Experiment 1: General Performances
In this experiment, we evaluated the general perfor-
mances of System API-Based methods (described in Sec-
tion 5) at detecting ransomware and generic malware. To
do so, for each strategy, we randomly split our dataset by
50%, thus using the first half to train the system and the
second half to evaluate the system. The number of trees
of the random forests was evaluated by performing a 10-
fold cross-validation on the training data. We repeated
the whole process 5 times, and we averaged the results
by also determining the standard deviation, in order to
understand the dependence of the system on the training
data.
Considering the multi-class nature of the problem, we
represented the results by calculating the ROC curve for
each API-based strategy in two different cases:
• Ransomware against benign samples. The cru-
cial goal of our work is detecting ransomware attacks
and, more importantly, to avoid them being consid-
ered as benign files. A critical mistake would most
likely compromise the whole device by locking it or
encrypting its data. For this reason, it is essential to
verify whether ransomware attacks can be confused
with benign samples.
• Generic malware against benign samples. Even
if System API-based strategies were employed to de-
tect ransomware, they could also be used to classify
generic malware (see Section 5). Hence, the goal here
is to verify, from a practical perspective, if System
API-based information can correctly detect other non-
ransomware attacks and distinguish them from legit-
imate files.
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Figure 3: Results of the temporal evaluation for the System
API-based strategies. The accuracy values are reported for the
three System API-based detection. The training data belong to
2016, while the test data is composed of ransomware released
in different months of 2017.
Results are reported in Figure 2. Parts (a) and (b) show
the ROC curves that describe the performances attained
on ransomware and generic malware detection by the three
System API-based methods (packages, classes, methods).
By observing these curves, we can deduce the following
facts:
1. All System API-based techniques were able to pre-
cisely detect more than 97% of ransomware samples
with only 1% of false positives. Because our dataset
included a consistent variety of families, we claim that
all strategies can detect the majority of ransomware
families in the wild. Worth noting, there are no dif-
ferences in results between using packages, classes or
methods. This result means that, concerning gen-
eral performances, using finer-grained features does
not improve detection.
2. All System API methods featured good accuracy with
relatively low false positives (around 90% at 1%, more
than 95% at 2%) at detecting generic malware. While
using class-related features did not bring significant
improvements to detection, using methods allowed for
a 10% improvement for false positive values inferior to
0.5%.
To better understand the results attained by our strate-
gies, parts (c), (d) and (e) report a ranking of features
used by the classifier for each strategy (respectively, pack-
ages, methods, and classes), according to their discrimi-
nant power. The feature ranking is calculated according
to the features Information Gain IG, given by the follow-
ing formulation:
IG(T, a) = H(T )−H(T |a) (1)
where H(T ) is the overall entropy for the whole dataset
T and H(T |a) is the average entropy obtained by splitting
the set T using the attribute a. The higher is the gain, the
more relevant the feature is.
As a result, note how the information gain for each fea-
ture is not so high, meaning that the system does not par-
ticularly overfit on specific information and that the final
decision is taken by considering a combination of multi-
ple features. At the same time, each feature value is re-
duced, in comparison to packages, by one magnitude for
classes and methods. In other words, using more features
allow for distributing the importance of the analyzed in-
formation through more elements. This characteristic is
two-faced: while it makes the overall behavior of the sys-
tem less interpretable, it may increase the effort that an
attacker has to make to evade the system.
Analyzing the most discriminant methods can give
a clearer idea of which information is used to classify
applications. Features are related to string building
(e.g., the ToString method), Array management (e.g.,
ArrayList@size, ArrayList@remove), creation of folders
(e.g., File@mkdirs), SMS, URI and Layout management,
and so forth. These features may be easily associated both
to ransomware and malware behavior, and the same be-
havior is shown on classes and packages.
6.3. Experiment 2: Temporal Performances
In this experiment, we assessed the capabilities of Sys-
tem API-based methods at detecting ransomware samples
that were first seen (according to the creation date of the
classes.dex executable belonging to each application) af-
ter the data that were used as training set. This assess-
ment is useful to understand if, without constant upgrades
to its training set, such methods would be able to detect
novel, unseen ransomware samples.
For this assessment, we included in the training set
(along with all generic malware and trusted samples) ran-
somware samples that were first seen before a date Dtr,
and we tested our system on a number of ransomware sam-
ples that were released on a date Dte for which Dte > Dtr
(the false positive threshold was set to 1%). We performed
our tests by choosing different values of Dte, where Dtr
is December 31st, 2016. Concerning test data, we were
able to retrieve only a little amount of samples whose first
release date was between January and September 2017.
Conversely, we could retrieve a consistent amount of sam-
ples whose Dte was November 2017. Hence, we considered
three main ranges for Dte: (i) January to September 2017;
(ii) October 2017; (iii) November 2017.
Results are provided in Figure 3, which shows that by
training the system with data retrieved in 2016, class- and
method-based strategies can accurately detect ransomware
test samples released in 2017. The package-based strat-
egy struggles with the test-set from November 2017, per-
forming significantly worse. However, this is a good result
considering the minimal number of features employed by
this strategy. Overall, we state that System API-based
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strategies can predict new ransomware attacks with good
accuracy. In this case, using finer-grained features brings
a consistent advantage to detection.
6.4. Experiment 3: Comparison with Other Approaches
This section proposes a comparison between Sys-
tem API-based strategies and other state-of-the-art ap-
proaches. We were particularly interested in comparing
our approach to other publicly available ones, with a spe-
cial focus on those who were specifically designed to detect
ransomware. To this end, we performed a temporal com-
parison of all systems on the ransomware samples released
in 2017 (for a total of 512 samples) by using as training
(when possible) all data released until 2016.
The state-of-the-art approach that is closest to what we
proposed in this paper (while being publicly available8)
is GreatEatlon [29]. Notably, it was not possible for us
to control the trained model of the system (it was only
possible to choose among a restricted set of classifiers), or
to train it with new data. Nevertheless, the system was
released in 2016, meaning that data that was first seen in
2017 was for sure not included in its training set. Although
not specifically tailored to ransomware detection, we also
tested the performances of RevealDroid (which is pub-
licly available9 [14]) on the same test data. In this case,
we could train the system with the same data used in our
systems, which allowed us to provide a fairer comparison.
Finally, we also tested the performances of the Android
version of IntelliAV (available on the Google Play Store)
[1]. As in GreatEatlon, we could not control the train-
ing data of the system. Moreover, as IntelliAV reports
three levels of risk for each app (safe, suspicious, risky),
we considered as malicious also the files that were labeled
as suspicious by the system.
As classifier for GreatEatlon we chose Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD), since this was the classifier that best
performed on our test samples. Concerning RevealDroid,
we chose the linear SVM classifier, as this was the one
that provided the best results in the original work [14].
IntelliAV only employed Random Forests. Results are
reported in Table 3.
The attained results show that System API-based tech-
niques obtained very similar performances to RevealDroid
(which could only, however, classify samples either as mal-
ware or benign). Such results are particularly interesting if
we consider that RevealDroid extracted a huge number of
features (more than 700, 000) from multiple characteristics
of the file, including native calls, permissions, executable
code analysis, which also depended on the training data.
With a much simpler set of information, we were able to
obtain very similar performance concerning accuracy. This
result is especially interesting from the perspective of ad-
versarial attacks, as using fewer features for classification
8https://github.com/necst/heldroid
9https://seal.ics.uci.edu/projects/revealdroid/
can make the system more robust against them (the at-
tacker can manipulate less information to evade the sys-
tem) [21]. The performances attained by System API-
based approaches were also better than IntelliAV, which
employed a combination of different features (including
permissions, user-defined API, and more). System API-
based strategies also performed significantly better than
GreatEatlon, which based its detection also on informa-
tion extracted from strings and language properties. No-
tably, using methods significantly improved the accuracy
performances in comparison to packages and classes, in
line to what obtained from Experiment 2.
6.5. Experiment 4: Resilience against Obfuscation
The goal of this experiment was assessing the robustness
of System API-based strategies against obfuscated sam-
ples, i.e., understanding whether the application of com-
mercial tools to samples could influence the detection ca-
pability of the systems. This evaluation is important, as
commercial obfuscation tools are quite popular nowadays
since they introduce good protection layers against static
analysis (e.g., to avoid pieces of legitimate applications to
be copied). Previous works showed that attackers could
exploit this aspect by obfuscating malware samples with
such tools, thus managing to bypass anti-malware detec-
tion [19].
In this experiment, we primarily focused on obfuscated
samples whose original (i.e., non-obfuscated) variant was
already included in the training set. Such a choice was
made because we wanted to assess if obfuscation was
enough to influence the key-features of System API-based
methods, thus changing the classifiers’ decision for a sam-
ple whose original label was malicious.
To this end, we employed a test-bench of ransomware
obfuscated with the tool DexProtector10, a popular, com-
mercial obfuscation suite that allows for protecting An-
droid applications through heavy code obfuscation. Al-
though such a tool is mostly used for legitimate purposes
(e.g., protection of intellectual properties), it can also be
used by attackers to make malicious applications harder
to be detected. Out of the 3017 ransomware samples, we
could obfuscate 2668 samples (the remaining could not be
obfuscated due to errors of the obfuscation software) with
three different strategies (for a total of 8004 obfuscated
samples). The strategies employed to obfuscate samples
were the following:
• String Encryption. This strategy encrypts strings
that are related to const-string instructions, and
injects a user-implemented method that performs de-
cryption at runtime.
• Resource Encryption. It encrypts the external
resources contained in the res and assets folders.
10https://dexprotector.com/
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Table 3: Detection performances for System API-based strategies, GreatEatlon, RevealDroid and IntelliAV on 512 ransomware
test files released in 2017, by using training data from 2016.
System Benign Malware Ransomware
System API (Methods) 7 12 493
System API (Classes) 10 15 487
System API (Packages) 11 32 469
RevealDroid 0 512 /
IntelliAV 18 494 /
GreatEatlon 118 394 /
To do so, it adds System API information to the
classes.dex file, in order to properly manage the
encryption routines.
• Class Encryption. This strategy encrypts user-
implemented classes, and injects routines that allow
to perform dynamic loading of such classes.
Figure 4 reports the accuracy attained by the three Sys-
tem API-based strategies against the obfuscated samples.
Such results show that all the detection strategies (with-
out significant differences between each other) are resilient
against obfuscation attempts. However, Class Encryption
deserves separate consideration. This strategy employs
heavy obfuscation, and it was explicitly performed to de-
feat static analysis. Typically, none of the static-based
techniques that analyze the executable file should be able
to detect such attacks correctly. However, this obfusca-
tion strategy introduces a very regular sequence of System
API-based routines that manage runtime decryption of the
executable contents.
For this reason, it is sufficient to inject only one sam-
ple inside the training set to make all obfuscated samples
to be detectable. Hence, we added the +1 mark to Class
Encryption. Notably, this may create false positives when
legitimate samples are obfuscated with the same strategy.
Nevertheless, it is sporadic to find such applications, as
Class Encryption strongly decreases the application per-
formances [19], and much simpler obfuscation techniques
are generally used.
7. Implementation and Performances
Although many solutions have been proposed in the wild
to detect ransomware and generic malware, almost none
(with the exception, for example, of [1]) was ported to An-
droid devices, often due to the complexity of the proposed
approaches. However, an offline, on-device solution is very
useful to perform early detection of applications down-
loaded, for example, from third-party markets (which are
more subjected to malware attacks). For this reason, and
also to demonstrate the suitability of System API-based
approaches, we ported the simplest of the three strate-
gies (Package-based) with the name of R-PackDroid (as
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Figure 4: Accuracy performances attained on ransomware sam-
ples that have been obfuscated with three different techniques.
The accuracy values are reported for the three System API-
based detection.
it implements the same approach introduced in our previ-
ous work [20]). This implementation scans for any down-
loaded, installed and updated applications, and it classifies
them as ransomware, malware or legitimate. If an appli-
cation is found as malicious, the user can immediately re-
move it.
R-PackDroid has been designed to work on the largest
amount of devices possible. Hence, during its develop-
ment, we focused on optimizing its speed and battery con-
sumption. For this reason, we avoided any textual parsing
of bytecode lines (which can be attained by transform-
ing the .dex file to multiple .smali files with ApkTool).
Therefore, we resorted to DexLib, a powerful parsing li-
brary part of the baksmali11 disassembler (and used by
ApkTool itself), to directly extract method calls and their
related packages. This library allowed to obtain a very
high precision at analyzing method calls and significantly
reduces the presence of bugs or wrong textual parsing in
the analysis phase.
The classification model has been implemented by using
11https://github.com/JesusFreke/smali
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Tensorflow12, an open source, machine learning frame-
work which has been designed to be also used in mobile
phones. In particular, we adapted its Random Forest im-
plementation (TensorForest) to the Android operating
system. Notably, our Android application only performs
classification by using a previously trained classifier. The
training phase is carried out separately, on standard X86
architectures. This choice was made to ensure the max-
imum easiness of use to the final user, thus reducing the
risk of invalidating the existing model.
Figure 5: An example of the Android R-PackDroid screen.
Figure 5 shows an example of the main screen of
R-PackDroid. The application is parsed either when it
is downloaded from any store, or when the user decides to
scan it (or to scan the whole file system). Each applica-
tion is identified by a box, whose color is associated with
the application label (green for trusted, red for malware
and violet for ransomware). After getting the result, by
clicking on each box related to the scanned application, it
is possible to read more details about the packages that
it employs, as well as general information such as the app
hash and size. Moreover, if the user believes that the re-
sult reported by R-PackDroid is wrong, she can report it
by simply tapping a button (a privacy policy to accept is
also included). To this scope, we resort to the popular
service FireBase13. R-PackDroid is available for free on
the Google Play Store (for the moment, Android versions
until 7.1 are supported).
12https://www.tensorflow.org/
13https://firebase.google.com/
7.1. Computational Performances
We analyzed the computational performances of
R-PackDroid by running it both on X86 and Android en-
vironments. In particular, we focused on extracting the
time interval between the .apk loading and the generation
of the feature vector for 100 benign samples (grouped by
their .apk size)14. The choice of benign samples was made
because they are typically more complex to be analyzed in
comparison with generic malware and ransomware. We
first ran our experiments on a 24-core Xeon machine with
64 GB of RAM. The attained results, shown in Figure 6,
proved that our system could analyze even huge applica-
tions in less than 0.2 seconds.
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Figure 6: Analysis performances on a X86 workstation, with
the elapsed time in seconds, for different .apk sizes.
To evaluate the performances of R-PackDroid on a real
Android phone, we ran the same analysis on a Nexus 5,
a 5-years-old, 4-core device with 2 GB of RAM, equipped
with the 6.0.1 version of Android. Results are reported
in Figure 7. Even if the analysis times were slower than
X86 machines, and even if we were using, in this case,
the slowest version of the algorithm, the average analy-
sis time for very large apps was slightly more than 4 sec-
onds. This result was very encouraging, and it showed that
R-PackDroid could be safely used even on old phones. The
higher dispersion of the time values, in comparison to the
ones attained in the previous picture, was possibly caused
by the presence of other background processes in the de-
vice.
Finally, it is also important to observe that the analysis
time is not strictly proportional to the .apk size, as the
file may contain additional resources (e.g., images) that
increase the .apk size, without influencing the size of the
DexCode itself. For this reason, it was not surprising to
see the attained average values did not necessarily increase
with the .apk size.
14The elapsed time to classify a sample, i.e., to read its feature
vector and get the final label, is negligible.
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Figure 7: Analysis performances on a real device, with the
elapsed time in seconds, for different .apk sizes.
8. Discussion and Limitations
The results attained in Sections 6 and 7 can be summa-
rized with the following findings:
• Finding 1. System API-based information could be
effectively used, alone, to properly distinguish ran-
somware from generic malware and legitimate appli-
cations.
• Finding 2. Using finer-grained information (classes
and methods), albeit involving more features in the
analysis, brought significant improvements to ac-
curacy when detecting previously, unseen samples.
Moreover, using API-methods allowed for more ac-
curacy under low false positives values.
• Finding 3. System API-based approaches could ob-
tain comparable performances to other approaches
that involved more features of different types.
• Finding 4. System API-based approaches guaran-
teed robustness against typical obfuscation strategies
such as string encryption. However, by including a
few obfuscated samples in the training set, it was also
possible to detect heavy, anti-static obfuscation tech-
niques such as class encryption.
• Finding 5. System API-based approaches were well
suitable to be ported and implemented on mobile
devices, with excellent computational performances
even on very large applications.
It is also interesting to discuss further the differences be-
tween employing a vast set of features (as it happens, e.g.,
in methods), and a tiny set (as it happens, e.g., in pack-
ages). While it is true that using packages could allow
achieving similar detection performances in comparison to
methods, there may be additional issues in using the first
strategy under adversarial perspectives. For example, the
feature ranking shown in Section 6.2 demonstrates that a
skilled attacker, who may have advanced knowledge of the
system (e.g., its most discriminant features), may under-
mine the detection capabilities of the system by changing
a small number of features. Furthermore, adding packages
can be significantly more comfortable than adding specific
methods, as some of the latter cannot be used without
declaring specific parameters (we are not considering, in
this case, the possibility of dead code as it can be eas-
ily ruled out during the pre-processing phase). We plan to
inspect the adversarial aspects of Android ransomware de-
tection (by also employing, for example, attack algorithms
such as the one used in [7]) in future work.
Another limitation to point out is that System API-
based calls can be theoretically bypassed by an attacker
who builds malicious samples by using its routines. How-
ever, this requires a very consistent effort, which is most of
times not compatible with performing fast and widespread
attacks.
It is also worth noting that since Android Oreo (8.0),
Google introduced new defenses against background pro-
cesses that are typical of ransomware (e.g., the ones that
directly lock the device). However, this does not exclude
other malicious actions on the application level. For this
reason, it is always better to have an additional system
that can detect attempts at performing malicious actions.
Finally, we also point out that, during our tests, we
found samples that could not be analyzed due to crashes
and bugs of the DexLib library, and that have therefore
been excluded from our analysis. However, their percent-
age (regarding the whole corpus that we analyzed) is neg-
ligible (less than 1% of the whole file corpus).
9. Conclusions
In this work, we provided a detailed insight into how
System API-based information could be effectively used
(also on a real device) to detect ransomware and to dis-
tinguish it from legitimate samples and generic malware.
The attained experimental results demonstrated that, by
using a compact set of information tailored to the detec-
tion of a specific malware family (ransomware), it was
possible to achieve detection performances (also on other
malware families) that were comparable to systems that
employed a much more complex variety of information.
Moreover, System API-based information also proved to
be valuable to detect obfuscated samples that focused on
hiding user-implemented information. Notably, although
it is tempting to combine as many information types as
possible to detect attacks (or to develop computationally
heavy approaches), it may not be the only, feasible way
to construct accurate, reliable malware detectors. For this
reason, we claim that future work should focus on develop-
ing reliable, small sets of highly discriminant features that
cannot easily be manipulated by attackers (with a partic-
ular reference to machine learning attacks). Moreover, a
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clear understanding of the impact of each feature on the
classifier detection (also known as explainability) can help
analysts understand the classifiers errors and to improve
their detection capabilities.
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